

Andrei Macsut
Romanian Academic Society

Corruption networks: A model of corruption in sub-national units

21 March 2023, Sofia


Implemented by:



Mythbusting

- Corruption is not a homogenous phenomenon
- Competition between rival corruption networks
- Political competition is often “a façade for competition of patronal networks” (Magyar and Madlovics 2020, 398–99)
- Differences according to incumbency, electoral performance, and type of office (decision-maker or lower-level civil servant)

General model of Romanian corruption




- Elections change not just incumbents but entire networks
- Rival networks monitor and denounce each other

Competing networks – incumbency bias

- Mayors from the same party as the county council president are indicted much less than those from a different party
- No such incumbency bias for corruption related to EU funds
- County bosses tolerate corruption within their own network

Competing networks – electoral performance



- Green – change in local ruling party at least once between 2008-2020
- Red - No change in local ruling party (party stronghold)

Competing networks – electoral performance II

Indictments of proven corruption cases in strongholds (left) and counties with power turnover (right) by office type and incumbency

	Decisionmakers	Lower-level civil servants	Total	Excluding Bucharest	Decisionmakers	Lower-level civil servants	Total
Incumbent	127	122	249	Incumbent	198	289	487
Opposition	150	209	359	Opposition	163	159	322
Total	277	331	608	Total	361	448	809

- **Significantly fewer people are convicted in party strongholds than in more competitive counties, where power turnover has occurred more frequently**
- **Consolidated networks are less likely to denounce corrupt behavior**
- **More low lever civil servants are indicted when the party holding power at county level is also in government (p = .00526)**

Conclusions and recommendations

- Corruption is a heterogenous phenomenon
- Patronal networks compete for offices and resources
- Integrity agencies should focus on older, more consolidated networks
- Frequent power turnover may help controlling corruption

References

- Magyar, Bálint, and Bálint Madlovics. 2020. *The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes*.
- Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2020. *China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108778350>.
- Dimulescu, Valentina, Andrei Macsut, Tudor Oprea, Denisa Diaconu, Simona Ernu, and Simona Popescu. 2015. "Map of County Corruption 2010-2014." Romanian Academic Society. <http://romaniacurata.ro/harta-coruptiei>.

Contact:

ANDREI MACSUT– Researcher
Romanian Academic Society

Tel.: +4021 211 14 77

E-mail: office@sar.org.ro

andrei.macsut@sar.org.ro