

# Assessment and Monitoring of Corruption and Anti-corruption: Evolution and Challenges in Southeast Europe

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
# Evolution of corruption and anti-corruption measurement in Southeast Europe

- First steps: corruption perception
- Finding the evidence: experiences with corruption, a victimization approach
- Understanding the problem: assessment and monitoring of anti-corruption measures
- Tackling high-level corruption: the challenge of assessing State Capture

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
# Corruption pressure in the region, % (2014 and 2016)



Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016


# 20 years of corruption victimization research

## Corruption Pressure Bulgaria 1999 - 2018




# Feasibility of policy responses to corruption (%)

(Corruption can **not** be substantially reduced, % of the population 18+)




Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016

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
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# Levels and content of anticorruption policies and approaches to corruption assessment






# MACPI monitoring cycle




# Corruption pressure (MACPI)

Reported by officials in the assessed public organizations (MACPI)



# AC policy assessment

- AC policy assessment at the level of public organizations
- Good formal implementation of AC policies
- Low real compliance




# MACPI anti-corruption policy assessment in a Bulgarian public organization

AC policies	Implementation			
	Formal compliance		Real compliance	
Bulgarian Public Organization	Awareness (%)	Strict implementation (%)	Strict control (%)	Strict application of sanctions (%)
Anti-corruption Policy 1	94	91	63	59
Anti-corruption Policy 2	91	89	60	51
Anti-corruption Policy 3	93	79	51	44
Anti-corruption Policy 4	90	77	49	49
Anti-corruption Policy 5	90	81	48	51
Anti-corruption Policy 6	89	88	50	56
Anti-corruption Policy 7	93	89	54	50
Anti-corruption Policy 8	91	86	55	50
Anti-corruption Policy 9	91	83	52	47
Anti-corruption Policy 10	88	79	44	47

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# Levels and content of anticorruption policies and approaches to corruption assessment






# State Capture: definition

**A combination of different forms of corruption which have a single objective: to secure wholesale (by default) and long term privileges to captors by exploiting the power of government for private benefit.**


# State Capture: model






# MACPI State Capture

- A new instrument was developed
- Instrument level: national
- Assessment source: experts and public officials
- Coverage:



# Ineffectiveness of Regulatory Public Organizations, Bulgaria (pilot data)



0%

50%

100%

■ Ineffectiveness of Regulatory Public Organizations

# Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Policies, Bulgaria (pilot data)

Organization	Estimated Pressure from Above	Estimated Involvement in Corruption
Municipal administrations	95%	90%
Road Infrastructure Agency	91%	73%
Commission for Protection of Competition	90%	70%
Customs Agency	86%	67%
National Health Insurance Fund	82%	70%
National Revenue Agency	89%	70%

## F: Construction, monopolization risk: 45%

Statement	%
<b>A specific company or a small number of companies win too many public tenders</b>	<b>81%</b>
Laws that provide illegitimate competitive advantage	31%
Control and/or sanctions are applied selectively which helps particular companies	42%
Concentration of grants in the sector (euro funds, direct subsidies, etc.)	31%

## 4646: Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods, monopolization risk: 70%

Statement	%
<b>A specific company or a small number of companies win too many public tenders</b>	<b>55%</b>
Laws that provide illegitimate competitive advantage	33%
<b>Control and/or sanctions are applied selectively which helps particular companies</b>	<b>45%</b>
Concentration of grants in the sector (euro funds, direct subsidies, etc.)	2%

## 4671: Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, monopolization risk: 85%

Statement	%
A specific company or a small number of companies win too many public tenders	42%
Laws that provide illegitimate competitive advantage	34%
<b>Control and/or sanctions are applied selectively which helps particular companies</b>	<b>74%</b>
Concentration of grants in the sector (euro funds, direct subsidies, etc.)	2%

# Conclusions

- Measuring administrative corruption (with CMS) provides objective experience-based quantitative information about the general corruption environment in a country (at the national level), however it is not sufficient to give details about how to address corruption issues properly at the level of public organizations.
- The effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts (e.g. special AC bodies, AC policies, AC policy tools) should be assessed and monitored regularly with **independent tools** (e.g. MACPI).
- When anti-corruption efforts fail to lead to long-term improvement, prevalent high-level corruption might be involved: a State Capture scenario. State Capture scans can show the risk of State Capture in a country as well as problematic areas where more focused diagnostics should be made.



**Thank you !**