Kremlin’s informal networks of influence use political, media and civil society mechanisms to manipulate public opinion and undermine the support for Bulgaria’s accession to the eurozone, the government’s backing of Ukraine and the energy transition process. To this end, they leverage coordinated (dis)information campaigns around key political decisions or events that aim to sway public attitudes and delay critical reforms.
These are some of the main findings of two recent CSD studies, The Kremlin Playbook against Offshore Wind Energy in Bulgaria and Webs of deceit: Online Information Manipulation Networks in Bulgaria and Romania, presented during a public discussion on "The Democratic Shield against Russian Disinformation: Economic and Information (In)Security " held on March 4th in Sofia.
The discussion focused on the (dis)information campaigns that have reinforced euroscepticism among the Bulgarian population, have impacted the country’s key political decisions and have put pressure on institutions, delaying or blocking important reforms. One of the assessments reveals how these campaigns have targeted the unlocking of the offshore wind energy sector in Bulgaria by manipulating the public opinion and by exerting political pressure against the adoption of a special legislative framework for attracting foreign investment.
The participants in the discussion placed a strong emphasis on Bulgaria's vulnerability to Kremlin-linked disinformation messages. An emerging trend has been the attempt by disinformation actors to place real facts in a misleading context to manipulate public attitudes.
The panellists agreed that there is a need to build protective mechanisms - both in the form of stronger democratic institutions capable of effectively enforcing the provisions of EU legislation on digital services and markets, and by raising public awareness and strengthening media literacy and critical thinking.
There is also a need to strengthen institutional capacity to counter information space threats, for example, by creating specialised strategic communications departments or expanding the role of ministry press centres, as is already happening in the foreign and defence ministries. These are some of the first steps in building societal resilience to disinformation and malicious external interference.
