State capture risks have undermined the quality of democratic governance across Latin America. While countries such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia exhibit some of the most severe symptoms, where organized crime, political patronage, and foreign authoritarian influence openly dominate public institutions, Argentina presents a more nuanced picture. Despite recurring corruption scandals, politicization of the judiciary, and long-standing ties between corrupt business and political elites, Argentina has maintained a higher degree of institutional resilience compared to its neighbors. The stronger institutional independence has provided a key backstop to the consistent attempts of authoritarian states including China, Russia and Iran to expand their economic and political influence in key vulnerable sectors such as energy, finance and infrastructure.
This was one of the main focal points of the expert dialogue Argentina at the Crossroads: Navigating State Capture Risks in a Shifting Global Landscape, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 18, 2025, co-organized by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and CADAL. The event gathered leading EU and Argentine policymakers, governance and energy experts, economists, and political scientists to examine the subtler mechanisms through which domestic elites and external powers intersect. Discussions also centered on what institutional reforms and safeguards would be necessary to strengthen Argentina’s democratic resilience and prevent a deeper slide into the dynamics of state capture that have destabilized other parts of the region.
Panelists highlighted the different dimensions and scope of state capture risks in Argentina. Sara Gálvez, an analyst from CSD’s Geoeconomics Program, explained how Russia exports its state capture model through corrosive capital, particularly via trade, focusing in Argentina on strategic sectors such as fertilizers and defense. It has also attempted to penetrate the nuclear energy, hydrocarbons, and transportation sectors, though with limited success. This includes investments in strategic areas, most notably in Vaca Muerta, as well as disinformation campaigns amplified by local media outlets such as RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo. While Russia’s overall economic footprint in Argentina is not large in absolute terms, it should be measured less by volume than by its strategic location.
Ignacio Hutin, Associate Researcher at CADAL, explained that while Russia’s direct influence declined after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, informal ties through local Kremlin enablers, especially through media and NGO networks, have grown in Argentina. He stressed that this influence, though weaker than in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba, cuts across party lines, as both Kirchner-era and later governments signed numerous agreements with Moscow, allowing its presence in Argentine institutions to persist despite shifts in intensity.
Daniel Redondo, former Secretary of Energy Planning in Argentina and professor at ITBA, focused on the major shifts in global energy markets after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He noted that despite Moscow’s use of sanction-evasion strategies such as “shadow tankers”, the war has weakened Russia’s capacity to wield influence in Latin America and to pursue strategic projects such as an LNG facility on the Atlantic coast or the construction of a nuclear energy plant. Once Argentina develops its enormous shale gas reserves in the Vaca Muerte field until the end of the decade, the country could significantly expand hydrocarbon exports to various regions, including to the European Union, undermining further the Russian gas supply there.
Andrés Repar, engineer at IESO, highlighted Argentina’s vast potential in Vaca Muerta but noted that the inefficient management of the state-owned company, YPF, and the lack of full market liberalization has undermined the country’s pathway to becoming a major export of natural gas to the global market.
The roundtable discussion also included a state capture risk mapping exercise, in which participants highlighted key governance deficits, exploited by China and Russia. These included the persistent weakening of state institutions, which are dominated by political appointees and state intervention in the day-to-day activities of national companies, including the oil and gas major, YPF. Experts also pointed out the fragmentation of civil society, which has failed to drive meaningful, institutional change. Poorly designed auditing laws and weak enforcement of political party financing rules have led to the politization of key regulators. Institutions have, thus, failed to implement a consistent, long-term strategy, which in the case of vulnerable sectors such as energy, has led to the deterioration of the financial management of state-owned companies and of the health of market competition.
The experts’ policy recommendations focused on reinforcing the process of public consultations around strategic policies and empowering civil society to more effectively oversee the public sector. There is a need to strengthen strategic institutions so that they consistently implement long-term policies, countering disinformation including from authoritarian states aiming to undermine important reforms, and reducing political interference in the management of state-owned enterprises by adopting a new governance model for public-private partnerships.
The discussion had one clear reform message: Argentina must strengthen institutions, modernize the governance of strategic sectors and reinforce oversight mechanisms to manage both domestic vulnerabilities and subtle foreign influence, ensuring that democratic governance and sustainable growth advance together.
