Drifting Apart. It has become very much in vogue amongst scholars and commentators to describe the increasingly divergent political leanings of boys and girls, young men and women, of late. These commentators highlight the rising conservatism among young male voters, while females increasingly support left-leaning/liberal policies. The recent elections in Germany served as a useful illustration of this point. The far-right AfD party received 27% of the vote share of young men aged between 18-24, whilst they only received about half that of their female counterparts. Similarly, Die Linke (‘The Left’) claimed 35% of the female, aged 18-24 vote, with only 16% of the male equivalent.[1] Yet, despite the significant coverage this phenomenon receives, few suggest solutions. The need for solutions is not called for because of these young men’s unusual preference for conservative politics, but because young men are increasingly turning to radical, far-right populists who ride anti-democratic, anti-migrant and often misogynist waves.[2]
What makes such subjects palatable to young men in Europe and US, why is it politically beneficial to espouse these narratives in the first place, and why are young men moving so far to the far-right?
Source: tagesschau[3]
It’s the Economy (& Education), Stupid. Many young men who feel abandoned in a changing world are drawn to leaders like Donald Trump who evoke nostalgia for past stability and sympathise with their fading traditional roles. Historically, men’s reliance on industrial jobs masked their underperformance in education and service roles, as heavy industries provided stable employment regardless of status. However, globalization and economic shifts have accelerated the decline of these industries, replacing them with service-based economies that favour a highly educated, skilled work force. Men’s natural strength advantage, once needed for the industries of old, is of little use for these new markets.
In education women are vastly outperforming men, now more so then ever. In the UK, 58% of undergraduate degrees go to women, and in the US, they earn 57% of bachelor’s degrees. Research suggests biological differences, like girls’ earlier cognitive development, contribute to this gap. Women are generally performing better in the service-based economies too. For instance, HEAL professions, which continue to expand rapidly, are now dominated by women. While men once succeeded without higher education, today’s job market demands qualifications they are less likely -or able- to pursue, exacerbating their sense of displacement.
Fragile Masculinity. The societal expectation that women were mothers and homemakers first, and all else second, was increasingly left behind – as was working class men’s ability to provide for families. Manhood, in contrast to womanhood, is understood as tentative, needing asserting. If not, one may “lose” it and become “less of a man.” The role of men as ‘breadwinners, first and foremost’ has been seriously threatened by the decline of heavy industry and manufacturing jobs in the developed West. This has devastated young men’s understanding of their place in society and family life. The effects are clear. In the UK, suicide is the leading cause of death among young men, with a rate three times higher than women. In the US, from 2007-2021, young men were about four times more likely to die by suicide, with boys accounting for four out of five teenage suicides.[4]
Source: CSD; World Health Organization[5]
Suicides are just one indicator of the masculinity crisis today. ‘Deaths of Despair,’ denoting deaths caused by drug overdoses, alcohol-related illnesses and suicides, as growing at an alarming rate in the US. Most are seen amongst the (white) working class, mainly in a response to the decline of economic fortunes and the breakdown of family life, and most victims of these are men (at a rate three times higher).[6] Alcohol related deaths have just hit a record high in the UK, and, again, men are more than twice as likely as women to die as a result of excess alcohol consumption. For those young men who have attempted suicide, the most commonly recorded words used to describe themselves were worthless and useless.[7] As Richard Reeves states, men, especially younger ones, feel culturally redundant today.[8]
High-Value Males. Yet, instead of understanding the male malaise as an unfortunate by-product of globalization, or certain men’s inability to adapt to a changing world, those affected have laid the blame firmly at the feet of women and the ‘radical left’ that have championed them. They have had some help in identifying the source of their ills, though. As history has shown us, extremist populist rhetoric thrives when times are tough - and times have seldom, if ever, been as tough for men in the West. The downgrading theory suggests that political violence is more likely sparked when a once-dominant group sees its status in society decline, against the perceived success of a rival group - women.[9] Young men, facing growing competition for jobs, education, and government resources, are also struggling in relationships. Over the past four decades, marriage rates for middle-aged men with a high school education have dropped by around 20%.
The young men and boys suffering from this ‘aggrieved entitlement’ have responded in a number of ways. Some young men, like the Hikikomori, have deemed society simply too difficult to navigate, and undergo a complete withdrawal from society. Those who subscribe to the ‘Men Going Their Own Way’ approach instead just isolate from women for fear of false accusations. Incels’ response is more menacing. They believe feminism has weakened the West, placing women, who they view as biologically inferior, above men. Incels see women as manipulative and believe men are entitled to sex. Bonding over shared victimhood, they express extreme misogyny and align with far-right ideologies, including racism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism. Several terror attacks have been inspired by incel ideology.
Online disinformation and hate speech have had a significant role in driving vulnerable young men towards extremist communities. A number of malign forces have contributed to young men, disillusioned with their place in the world, trapped in the alt-right manosphere’s echo chambers. Dysfunctional hybridity refers to the processes in which the interdependence among older and newer media logics may contribute to the erosion of democratic norms. The omnipresence of misinformation, such as during the recent Romanian presidential election, is a result of a “combination of media affordances and systemic trends: the design of social media platforms and search engines, and the intense competitive pressure on professional journalism caused by the digitalization of news and the acceleration of news cycles.”[10] As mainstream ‘old’ media struggles with revenue models dependent on clickbait and algorithm-driven content distribution, partisan actors leverage these vulnerabilities to spread politically charged mis- or disinformation(CSD, 2024, Transforming Europe’s Media Landscape).
Paralysis through Division. These echo chambers are populated by a wide variety of actors. Some are overtly political, with figures like Alex Jones or Steve Bannon. Others brand themselves as self-help gurus for disgruntled young men, often acting as gateways into these subcultures. Most notable amongst these are Andrew Tate and Jordan Peterson, who aim to guide men to self-actualization. However, not only do these actors often end up exploiting these vulnerable young men for their own financial benefit, but they contribute to their radicalization. The concept of “e-extremism” has emerged to describe this digital landscape where extremist ideologies, like extreme misogyny, racism, anti-Semitism and others, converge. These influencers use digital tactics, like viral hashtags and coordinated memes, to foster (self-) radicalization and inspire acts of terror in the physical world. Adopting the concept of “repertoires of contention,” they coordinate meme campaigns and real-life protests. Driven by a perceived loss of traditional manhood, they long for a time when white male dominance was legitimized.
Yet, they are not the only champions of ‘traditional values.’ The Kremlin’s disinformation channels have sought to project Russia as the ultimate defender and preserver of traditional European values: a bastion of conservatism against the liberalism of the West. Where the West is decadent, effeminate, multicultural and atheist, Russia is strong, family-orientated, patriotic, and god-fearing. The alignment of these Kremlin narratives with the ones promulgated by the icons of the alt-right manosphere compliments Putin’s efforts to utilize disinformation and hate speech to stoke division in European domestic politics. Alt-right media, with its anti-establishment rhetoric, helps the Kremlin undermine elections, government stability, and public trust, gaining allies in euroskeptic and NATO-skeptic parties by injecting falsehoods into political debates. This furthers Putin’s goal of weakening the EU and the broader Euro-Atlantic alliance.
This digital radicalization aligns with revisionist state’s geopolitical strategies, such as Russia’s disinformation campaigns, which weaponize societal divisions to undermine Western stability. The significant structural forces at play that contribute to the male malaise have a wider variety of answers. Some suggestions include efforts to reduce the stigma surrounding men’s involvement in HEAL professions, increasing the number of male teachers and professors teaching boys, to even holding boys back an extra year in primary school.[11]
[1] The recent US Presidential election also drove this home: approximately 67% of Gen Z working class men voted for Trump; and young men and boys are also believed to have Brexited the UK out of the EU.
[2] See Gerganov, Boycheva & Markov (2024) Invisible Chains: Bulgaria's weak rule of law, corruption, and digital skills gap made it a hub for pro-Russian disinformation that targets Ukrainian women, amongst others (CSD, 2024, Gendered Disinformation: Challenges for Ukrainian Refugees).
[3] Tagesschau (2025). Bundestagswahl 2025: Stimmanteile bei 18-24-Jährigen [Federal Election 2025: Voting shares among 18-24 year olds]. Tagesschau.
[4] U.S. Center for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) (2022). Facts About Suicide.; WISQARS fatal injury database.
[5] World Health Organization (2021). Suicide worldwide in 2019: Global Health Estimates.
[6] Case, A. & Deaton, A. (2017). Mortality and morbidity in the 21st century. Papers on Economic Activity 2017: 397-476.
[7] Shand, F., et al. (2015). What might interrupt men’s suicides? Results from an online survey of men? BMJ Open 5(10).
[8] Reeves, R.V. (2024). Of Boys and Men. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
[9] This has been most often applied to large‐scale civil wars and ethnic groups, but can also help to explain the increased levels of smaller scale political violence (Walter, 2022. How Civil Wars Start – And How to Stop Them).
[10] Chadwick, A. (2017). The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 271.
[11] Reeves (2024).
