Social Media and the UK’s Far-Right: The UK, a key NATO ally with its fresh centre-left government looks as if it is tearing itself apart, with race riots gripping much of England. These riots have also spread to Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland, coming hot off the heels of ugly anti-migrant riots in Dublin just three weeks ago. In response to a hideous attack on a children’s dance class, far right activists quickly leapt at the opportunity to lay fault at a foot of a Muslim migrant new to the UK. Mosques have been attacked, hotels housing asylum seekers have been vandalised and threatened with arson, police officers assaulted, whilst the head of the platform formerly known as Twitter, starts fights with the new Prime Minister (PM) on X.
Here’s the kicker: the information that far-right protestors acted on was a false narrative that blamed a supposed migrant with a fake Muslim-sounding name, ‘Ali al-Shakati.’ When this was narrative first made inroads, hundreds of protestors gathered outside Southport mosque. It was targeted by flying objects, the police defending it was attacked, local shops were damaged, all whilst the protestors chanted ‘No Surrender’ and sang the name of far -right agitator ‘Tommy Robinson’ (Stephen Yaxley-Lennon). By the next day similar riots had spread to Manchester, Hartlepool, Middlesbrough and Sunderland. A week on, list of cities scourged by such rioting expanded to include Bristol, Liverpool, Leeds, Blackpool, Belfast and parts of London and Birmingham.
Disinformation Storm: The once great democratic hope that the internet was once hailed as has now come to be understood as a powerful weapon in the playbook of those forces seeking to undermine states, spread disunity and deepen the chasms of political polarisation. Indeed, in this case, social media platforms were a major factor contributing to the quick spread of far-right protesting, aiding with the proliferation of hate speech and disinformation and helping agitators to organise violent riots from as far away as Cyprus.[1] The lie about Ali al-Shakati quickly racked up an estimated 27m impressions on social media.[2] Notably, the false name and disinformation regarding the perpetrator did not originate from the social media speculation of such agitators, but from the account of an obscure ‘news outlet’ called Channel3 now. It was in part spread organically by the shares right-wing figures like Tommy Robinson, Lawrence Fox and Andrew Tate, but also by the dangerous algorithms of X (in particular) that allowed this ‘reporting’ to reach millions of sympathetic ears.[3] And of course, no UK right-wing extremist riot would be complete without contributions from the newly elected MP for Clacton Nigel Farage.
Nigel Farage on X, weighing in on the riots.
Source: X.
Such disinformation is a trademark of the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy which aims to hijack political agendas and shape public opinion in target countries (see Georgiev, G. & Novossiolova, T., Disinformation Storm: WMD Hybrid Threats in Bulgaria and Romania.). The strategy of the Kremlin’s generally integrates Soviet-era approaches with the great opportunities of modern information and communication technologies, such as online platforms and social media, to increase the scale and speed of disinformation messaging. Currently there is no substantive evidence that Channel3 are linked to the Kremlin. Instead, they are believed to merely be the product of individuals in, bizarrely, Pakistan, Nova Scotia and the State of Texas.
Hybrid Warfare: Russian propaganda ‘news outlets’ and telegram channels have joined in the distribution of the false narratives, jumping on the proverbial polarising bandwagon. Perhaps most suspect, Channel3 was also found to have dated videos of Russian origin on its YouTube channel. The incident has also revolved around one of the Kremlins favoured Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) subjects – concerns over migration (see Sabev, M., Georgiev, G. & McLaren, R., Safeguarding the Foundations: Strengthening Civil Security in Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). Furthermore, whilst this incident may not yet, or ever, be a direct result of the Kremlin’s activities, the race riots punctuate a long time of the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks on the UK. Just months ago, several British young men were charged with aiding the Russian state following an arson attack on a London warehouse linked to aid for Ukraine. In April, a British man was also accused of plotting attacks on Ukrainian businesses in east London having been recruited by Russian intelligence. There has been a litany of cyber-attacks on Britain’s critical infrastructure with the Kremlin understood as the culprit, and of course there was the attempted assassination of the Skripals on UK soil some years ago. This is all before mentioning the Kremlin’s FIMI campaigns.
Such hybrid warfare has taken effect, and has greatly contributed to the increased political polarisation on which the Kremlin thrives, and the effects that their FIMI campaigns have on their audiences and information landscapes are political and malign. Ultimately, these campaigns increase Kremlin’s cognitive capture of local audiences, facilitate social polarization and anti-democratic perceptions, and lead to a poorly informed public: the results of which are grossly apparent. Meaningful debate is now impossible in the UK: migrants are dangerous terrorists seeking to undermine British values, those who defend them are liberal snowflakes (or are part of a conspiracy to undermine Britain), and those who have genuine concerns about migration levels or a housing crisis can only be bigots or fascists.
The ‘Gatekeepers’: It is not just new media platforms that have contributed to this polarised landscape in which the Kremlin’s disinformation flourishes, though. Traditional news media in the UK, the so-called gatekeepers of the information world that maintain standards, have long painted migrants as a fundamental threat to Britain. Muslim people are especially associated with negative connotations. One of the worst offenders, the Daily Mail, depicts Muslims or Islam in a negative light in 78% of its stories featuring Muslims. It has been found that generally 59% of all articles associated Muslims with negative behaviours.
Examples of the Daily Mail’s divisive headlines
Source: Critical Currents in Islam; The Conversation.
The tools the Kremlin relies on in its political attack on Europe, with which is has unfortunately found highly effective in Central and South-eastern Europe in particular, generally revolves around large scale energy projects or deals, supporting radical political parties with anti-Western agendas, the flooding of the information space with pro-Kremlin (false) narratives and its corrosive capital and economic footprint. This playbook is also often assisted by institutional gaps and Russian soft power in target countries. Yet, the CSD’s research has also highlighted how the Putin’s illiberal tentacles may spread in states considered strong, healthy democracies with mature institutions designed to tackle the Kremlin’s playbook – such as Germany (see Stefanov, R., Vladimirov, M. & Köppen, M., Strategic Decoupling: Phasing out Russian economic influence in Germany). Thus, if such tentacles can take hold in one of the EU’s most powerful states, it can certainly do so in a UK that has, on its own accord, isolated itself from its allies on the European continent. Even if this particular incident is not found to be of the Kremlin’s origin once the dust settles, the new labour government should take this as a warning. If one piece of misinformation from an uninformed member of the public (The Guardian, 2024), or a Pakistani-Texan-Canadian mushroom website, can threaten to launch the UK into civil war (if Elon Musk is to be believed) imagine what the Kremlin’s troll farms can do.
Elon Musk on X, responding to footage of the riots in the UK
Source: X.
Russia’s malign influence campaign exploits and thrives on social, economic, and political polarization, as well as democratic deficits and governance gaps, which provide important entry points for the Kremlin and other authoritarian influences. The undue power social media has been granted has clearly been identified as a democratic deficit in the liberal order, as it wrestles with dilemmas surrounding freedom of speech. The UK should remain intent on fully enacting its OSA and not shy away from a confrontation with Big Tech and the sovereign individual-wannabes, if it is to address this gap. Yet this ugly situation highlights the challenges and opportunities beyond the British Isles. The OSA is an example of an institutional framework that aims to regulate the supply of problematic content, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, and incitement to violence and also punish violators harshly. A functional institutional framework that reduces the supply as well as the demand for such content by deploying a combination of deterrence and preventative measures will benefit any state in this digital decade. Measures should be packaged in an integrated national approach with several layers of defense, including institutional capacity and procedures, digital forensics infrastructure and of course the technical knowhow needed to monitor the integrity of online information space. Regarding the Kremlin’s FIMI, countering pro-Russian disinformation needs to extend beyond information operations and strategic communications (though these should not be disregarded either). An integrated national approach for countering hybrid threats should be developed in any state the Kremlin has identified as a target. These states should also seek to publicly expose and pre-bunk Russian plans and underlying intents, including by declassifying intelligence when deemed necessary.
[1] Philips, J., Tommy Robinson accused of stoking far-right riots as he posts 'from five-star Cyprus hotel.' The Standard. 5 August 2024.
[2] Jones, M.O., Thread on the #Southport anti-migrant and anti-Muslim disinformation and propaganda. 30 July 2024.
[3] Institute for Strategic Dialogue, From rumours to riots: How online misinformation fuelled violence in the aftermath of the Southport attack. Digital Dispatches. 31 July 2024.
